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LOYALTY LOSES GROUND TO MARKET 
FREEDOM IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
DANIEL HARRIS* 
ABSTRACT 
In the last decade, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a much 
less moralistic and much more market-oriented approach to ques-
tions of fiduciary loyalty. In cases involving fiduciaries with con-
flicts of interest, the Court has shifted the burden of proof to the party 
claiming unfair treatment, thereby protecting deals and making 
loyalty harder to enforce. The Court has also struck down or nar-
rowly construed laws designed to prevent disloyalty by fiduciaries 
on the theory that broad prohibitions on business conduct encroach 
on constitutionally protected freedoms. 
This Article discusses how the Supreme Court’s new approach 
represents a departure from the Court’s own precedents and from 
the fiduciary principles still followed by the State courts. The Arti-
cle also considers how the changes in Supreme Court jurisprudence 
reflect changing attitudes toward loyalty in this country, particu-
larly among the financial elites. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, there has been a “renaissance” of schol-
arly interest in fiduciary theory,1 including a spate of articles 
pushing for stricter scrutiny of fiduciaries.2 During this same time, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has taken federal law in precisely the op-
posite direction, by rejecting or refusing to follow old rules designed 
to safeguard fiduciary loyalty.3 
The Supreme Court’s trend is most evident in cases involving 
fiduciaries accused of profiting at the expense of those they were 
supposed to protect.4 The traditional standard requires such fiduci-
aries to prove they have not taken unfair advantage of the pow-
ers entrusted to them.5 But in recent cases, the Supreme Court 
shifted the burden of proof to the party claiming unfair treat-
ment, protecting deals and making loyalty harder to enforce.6 
The trend may also be seen in decisions striking down or 
narrowly construing laws banning corporate campaign expendi-
tures or prohibiting dishonesty by fiduciaries.7 The Court held that 
these laws could only be used to stop fiduciaries from taking per-
sonal bribes in exchange for official action.8 Broader use against 
                                                                                                                         
1 See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: 
A Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820, 1822 (2016) (“‘Fiduciary political theory’ is a bur-
geoning intellectual project that uses fiduciary principles to analyze aspects of 
public law.”); Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 513, 516 (2015) (“Fiduciary theory is undergoing a renaissance.”). 
2 Articles urging expansion of the fiduciary principle include Isaac D. Buck, 
Furthering the Fiduciary Metaphor, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1043 (2016); Evan J. Criddle, 
Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemak-
ing, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010); Dayna Bowen Matthew, Implementing American 
Health Care Reform: The Fiduciary Imperative, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 715 (2011); 
D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 672 (2013). 
3 See Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 351 (2010); Skilling v. 
United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010); Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 384–85 (2009); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 
105, 116 (2008); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 233–34 (2000). 
4 See, e.g., Wardell v. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 651, 656–57 (1880); Michoud v. 
Girod, 45 U.S. 503, 553–55 (1846).  
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1957). 
6 See, e.g., Jones, 559 U.S. at 347; Metro. Life Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 116–17. 
7 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66. 
8 See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 408–09. 
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other forms of disloyalty, the Supreme Court held, improperly en-
croached on constitutionally protected freedoms.9 
Taken together, these decisions show a general trend that 
has been overlooked in the academic literature.10 In a wide variety 
of settings, the Supreme Court has prioritized contract norms over 
fiduciary principles and market freedom over precedent.11 
Put in terms of fiduciary theory, the Supreme Court is see-
ing fiduciary relationships as increasingly closer to contractual 
ones.12 For the Court, the special obligations of fiduciaries seem 
to be getting smaller.13 Good or bad, the trend is big news. 
Part I of this Article shows that the recent cases represent 
a major change in how the Supreme Court regulates fiduciaries. 
Part II puts the trend into a larger context: the Court’s new ap-
proach is at odds with traditional loyalty norms still enforced by 
state courts and supported by most scholars, but it is consistent 
with a more transactional approach to relationships, contractar-
ian legal scholarship, and the evolving views of financial elites. 
I. FIDUCIARY LOYALTY IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
A. The Traditional Standard for Regulating Fiduciary Conflicts 
To appreciate how much the Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sions depart from past practice, it is first necessary to understand 
the traditional standard for regulating fiduciary conflicts of in-
terest that the Supreme Court has recently chosen not to follow. 
Let us begin with some basics. A fiduciary is a person (such as 
                                                                                                                         
9 See, e.g., Skilling, 561 U.S. at 408–09, 412; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 
328–29. 
10 Some commentators, however, have seen the connection between a small 
subset of the recent loyalty decisions: the criminal corruption cases like Skilling 
and the campaign finance cases like Citizens United. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, 
A Theory of Bribery, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947 (2017); Jacob Eisler, The Unspoken 
Institutional Battle Over Anti-Corruption: Citizens United, Honest Services, 
and the Legislative-Judicial Divide, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363 (2010). 
11 See, e.g., Skilling, 561 U.S. at 410; Jones, 559 U.S. at 351; Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., 554 U.S. at 116; Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231–35 (2000).  
12 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary 
Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 431, 443–44 (1993). 
13 See, e.g., Skilling, 561 U.S. at 410; Jones, 559 U.S. at 351; Metro. Life 
Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 116; Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231–32. 
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an agent or trustee) who has been entrusted with authority or re-
sources to use for the benefit of another person (whom we can call 
a “principal”).14 The duty of loyalty is the fiduciary’s obligation to 
remain faithful to that charge and use the entrusted resources 
and authority solely for the benefit of the principal.15 
In the words of Section 170(1) of the Restatement (Second) 
of Trusts: “The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to ad-
minister the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.”16 Or as 
Section 387 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency puts it when 
describing the duty of loyalty for agents: “Unless otherwise agreed, 
an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the 
benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency.”17 
Fiduciaries who simply take money from the till and put 
it into their own pockets are clearly violating their duty of loyalty. 
But what if the fiduciary uses entrusted authority to effectuate a 
transaction that confers a personal benefit on the fiduciary? Ac-
cording to the traditional rule, such a conflict of interest transac-
tion is illegal unless the fiduciary proves that he or she made a 
complete disclosure of all material facts and that the transaction 
was substantively fair to the principal.18 
In the nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted 
this rule as a matter of common law and equity.19 For example, 
in Michoud v. Girod,20 decided in 1846, executors of an estate sold 
property of the estate to a dummy purchaser who then sold the 
property to the executors five days later. The Court held the con-
cealed self-dealing transaction was illegal because under “the mo-
rality and policy of the law” and the rule of equity “in every code 
of jurisprudence with which we are acquainted, that a purchase 
                                                                                                                         
14 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
15 Id. 
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1957). 
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (AM. LAW INST. 1957); see also 
Rave, supra note 2, at 695 (“This exclusive-benefit principle is the heart of the 
fiduciary relationship.”). 
18 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1957); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1957); see also 
Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1949). 
19 See Wardell v. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 651, 657–58 (1880); Michoud v. Girod, 
45 U.S. 503, 553 (1846). 
20 Michoud, 45 U.S. at 508, 565. 
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by a trustee or agent of the particular property of which he has the 
sale, or in which he represents another ... carries fraud on the face of 
it.”21 The Supreme Court explained: “The general rule stands upon 
our great moral obligation to refrain from placing ourselves in 
relations which ordinarily excite a conflict between self-interest 
and integrity.”22 The Court went on to explain that if an executor 
wants to purchase property from the estate, the executor should 
do so after full disclosure and court approval based on proof that 
the transaction is in the best interest of the beneficiaries.23 
The Court reaffirmed these principles in 1880 in another 
self-dealing case.24 The executive directors of the Union Pacific Rail-
road set up a coal company that they personally (and secretly) 
owned.25 The directors then authorized a contract between the rail-
road and that coal company that gave the coal company the right 
to mine coal on land owned by the railroad and then sell the coal 
back to the railroad at a profit.26 In a unanimous opinion authored 
by Justice Field, the Court said that the transaction was “utterly 
indefensible and illegal” because the directors’ “character as agents 
forbade the exercise of their powers for their own personal ends 
against the interest of the company.”27 
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court repeatedly read 
these principles into the silences and ambiguities of federal statu-
tory law.28 A prime example is the 1939 decision in Pepper v. 
Litton.29 The dominant shareholder of a coal company secured a 
judgment against the company for unpaid wages and a supporting 
lien that, according to a state court, gave him priority over other 
creditors of the company.30 A federal bankruptcy court, however, 
disallowed the dominant shareholder’s claim because of his fidu-
ciary relationship to the company.31 The Supreme Court affirmed, 
                                                                                                                         
21 Id. at 553. 
22 Id. at 555. 
23 Id. at 557–58. 
24 Wardell, 103 U.S. at 651, 657–58. 
25 Id. at 654–55, 657. 
26 Id. at 653–54, 656–57. 
27 Id. at 657–58. 
28 See, e.g., Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd. v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 330 (1981); 
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306–07 (1939). 
29 See generally Pepper, 308 U.S. 295. 
30 Id. at 297–301. 
31 Id. at 301. 
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holding that because of the conflict of interest, the transaction was 
subject to rigorous scrutiny with the controlling shareholder hav-
ing the burden of proving substantive fairness.32 
The unanimous opinion by Justice Douglas explained that, 
under equitable principles incorporated into the federal bank-
ruptcy law, the dominant shareholder had the burden 
not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show 
its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and 
those interested therein. The essence of the test is whether or not 
under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks 
of an arm’s length bargain.33  
The Court went on to explain that the fiduciary cannot “violate 
the ancient precept against serving two masters .... He cannot 
use his power for his personal advantage and to the detriment of 
the stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in terms 
that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy 
technical requirements.”34 The “ancient precept” referenced in the 
Court’s opinion justifying the overriding duty of loyalty came from 
the Gospel of Matthew in the New Testament: “No man can serve 
two masters.”35 
In the waning years of the twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court continued to follow the traditional standard, although with 
less moralistic verve.36 For example, in 1981, the Court remanded 
a criminal case for further review because of concern that there 
might be a conflict of interest between criminal defendants and 
their lawyer, who was being paid by the defendants’ former em-
ployer.37 None of the parties had raised the conflict issue, but the 
Court thought that it deserved a hearing.38 The opinion by Jus-
tice Powell in Wood v. Georgia explained: “Where a constitutional 
right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there 
is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of 
                                                                                                                         
32 Id. at 306. 
33 Id. at 306–07 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
34 Id. at 311. 
35 Id. at 295; Matthew 6:24 (King James). 
36 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 504 (1996); Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd. 
v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329–30 (1981); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 
261, 271–72 (1981). 
37 Wood, 450 U.S. at 267–68, 270–71. 
38 Id. at 267–68. 
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interest. ... Here, [the defendants’ lawyer] may not have pursued 
their interests single-mindedly.”39 
In another 1981 case, National Labor Relations Board v. 
Amax Coal Company, involving the interpretation of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the Court said: “To 
deter the trustee from all temptation and to prevent any possible 
injury to the beneficiary, the rule against a trustee dividing his 
loyalties must be enforced with ‘uncompromising rigidity.’”40 Those 
general principles had to be read into ERISA, the Court said, be-
cause “we must infer that Congress intended to impose on trustees 
traditional fiduciary duties unless Congress has unequivocally 
expressed an intent to the contrary.”41 
The Court also took a broad view of fiduciary responsibility 
in a 1996 case, Varity Corporation v. Howe.42 Varity decided to spin 
off its money-losing divisions into a new company and to urge 
employees to work for that spin-off.43 After the spin-off failed, the 
employees sued claiming that the employer had been acting in its 
capacity of an ERISA fiduciary when it assured them that their 
benefits would be safe with the new company.44 Varity argued 
that it was acting in its capacity as an employer and was there-
fore not subject to a fiduciary duty.45 
The Supreme Court sided with the employees.46 The stat-
ute made a person an ERISA fiduciary “‘to the extent’ that he or 
she ‘exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary con-
trol respecting management’ of the plan, or ‘has any discretionary 
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration’ of 
the plan.”47 Conveying information about likely future benefits 
was sufficiently related to the management of the plan to impose 
a fiduciary duty, the Court held, since reasonable employees could 
have thought that Varity was communicating to them both in its 
capacity as employer and its capacity as an ERISA fiduciary.48 
                                                                                                                         
39 Id. at 271–72. 
40 Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd., 453 U.S. at 329–30. 
41 Id. at 330. 
42 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 498, 503 (1996). 
43 Id. at 493.  
44 Id. at 494. 
45 Id. at 495. 
46 Id. at 503. 
47 Id. at 498. 
48 Id. at 503. 
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The Court held that it was irrelevant that the challenged 
statements were not required by the ERISA statute or plan.49 The 
duty of loyalty, the Court explained, imposed obligations on fidu-
ciaries that go beyond the letter of the contract or the positive 
law.50 “If the fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than activi-
ties already controlled by other specific legal duties, it would serve 
no purpose.”51 
Campaign finance might seem far afield from our theme 
of fiduciary loyalty. But consider that elected officials are fiduci-
aries of their constituents. They exercise power that has been 
entrusted to them to serve others. They are public servants. Like 
other servants, they are supposed to be loyal to their masters, which 
for them is the public. Large campaign contributions are dangerous 
because the money might corrupt that loyalty to the public by induc-
ing officials to favor those who pay them over those the officials 
are supposed to represent. 
That, at least, was the theory the Supreme Court used in 
1976 to uphold restrictions on campaign contributions against a 
First Amendment challenge.52 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme 
Court said the restrictions were justified “to limit the actuality and 
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual finan-
cial contributions” reasoning that “[t]o the extent that large con-
tributions are given to secure political quid pro quo from current 
and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of repre-
sentative democracy is undermined.”53 
In 2003, the Court followed a similar approach in McConnell 
v. Federal Election Commission,54 holding that the McCain Feingold 
statute’s restrictions on campaign contributions were justified in 
order to ensure that elected officials were loyal to their constitu-
ents and not swayed from that loyalty by the corrupting influence of 
large campaign contributions.55 The Court explained: “Our cases 
have made clear that the prevention of corruption or its appearance 
constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political 
                                                                                                                         
49 Id. at 504. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976). 
53 Id. 
54 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 93–95 (2003). 
55 Id. at 143–45. 
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contribution limits.”56 The Court went on: “Take away Congress’ 
authority to regulate the appearance of undue influence and ‘the 
cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize 
the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.’”57 
A key assumption in the Court’s analysis was that elected 
officials should be loyal to their constituents, not to their large 
donors.58 It followed that banning large campaign contributions 
was a legitimate way to avoid the creation of a conflict between 
the duty of loyalty and financial self-interest.59 The Court said: 
“Our cases have firmly established that Congress’ legitimate inter-
est extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption 
to curbing ‘undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and 
the appearance of such influence.’”60 
B. The Supreme Court Changes Course 
And then the Supreme Court became much more deferen-
tial to (and protective of) the decisions of conflicted fiduciaries.61 
With surprising unanimity (except in the politically charged cam-
paign finance decisions), the Court’s tone and approach in loyalty 
related cases underwent a sea change.62 
The new era began around 2008. But there was a harbinger 
of what was to come in 2000 with Pegram v. Herdrich.63 Cynthia 
Herdrich experienced pain in her groin and went to see her doc-
tor, Lori Pegram, who worked for Carle Clinic, a for-profit HMO 
providing services to Herdrich pursuant to an ERISA plan.64  
Six days later, Dr. Pegram discovered a six by eight centimeter 
inflamed mass in Herdrich’s abdomen. Despite the noticeable 
inflammation, Dr. Pegram did not order an ultrasound diagnostic 
procedure at a local hospital, but decided that Herdrich would 
have to wait eight more days for an ultrasound, to be performed 
at a facility staffed by Carle more than 50 miles away. Before 
                                                                                                                         
56 Id. at 143. 
57 Id. at 144. 
58 Id. at 143–44. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 150. 
61 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 105 (2008). 
62 Id. 
63 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 211 (2000). 
64 Id. at 215. 
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the eight days were over, Herdrich’s appendix ruptured, caus-
ing peritonitis.65 
Herdrich sued for malpractice and won.66 Herdrich also 
claimed a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, alleging Pegram 
and Carle had an undisclosed financial interest in advising Her-
drich to delay treatment until she could go to the Carle facility 
and that this undisclosed conflict led Dr. Pegram to give Herdrich 
bad medical advice.67 The United States Court of Appeals held that 
the ERISA allegation stated a claim upon which relief could be 
granted,68 but the Supreme Court unanimously reversed in an 
opinion written by Justice Souter.69 
Even though the HMO was within the statutory definition 
of an ERISA fiduciary, the Court worried about the practical impli-
cations of treating its treatment decisions as fiduciary ones.70 
After all, the Court noted, conflicts of interest are ubiquitous.71  
In this case, for instance, one could argue that Pegram’s decision 
to wait before getting an ultrasound for Herdrich, and her insist-
ence that the ultrasound be done at a distant facility owned by 
Carle, reflected an interest in limiting the HMO’s expenses, which 
blinded her to the need for immediate diagnosis and treatment.72 
If traditional fiduciary standards were applied, the Court 
noted, almost every unsuccessful treatment decision by a for-profit 
HMO could be challenged as a breach of fiduciary duty under 
ERISA.73 That was not acceptable. There was no reason to add a 
federal remedy to state law malpractice claims.74 So treatment deci-
sions could not be subjected to fiduciary standards.75 “It is enough 
to recognize that the Judiciary has no warrant to precipitate the 
                                                                                                                         
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 215, 218. 
67 Id. at 211. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 213. 
70 Id. at 217–18. 
71 Id. at 212. 
72 Id. at 220. 
73 Id. at 211, 213. 
74 Id. at 235. 
75 Id. at 232–34. 
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upheaval that would follow a refusal to dismiss Herdrich’s ERISA 
claim.”76 
The Court took a similarly pragmatic approach in a 2008 
ERISA decision, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn.77 
ERISA benefit plans often provide that the same insurance com-
pany will act both as the decision-maker and the payor with respect 
to ERISA benefit claims.78 The question before the Court was the 
proper standard of review for such conflicting decisions.79 The 
governing statute left this issue open for the courts to decide.80 
The liberals, who prevailed, said that the conflict was a factor a 
reviewing court should consider, among many other things, in 
deciding whether to overturn a denial decision.81 The conserva-
tives believed that the conflict should only be considered if there 
was evidence that the conflict affected the decision.82 However, 
both sides agreed that the conflicted decision should be treated 
as presumptively correct and reviewed deferentially.83 
The majority opinion by Justice Breyer explained that Con-
gress had not expressly required de novo review and adopting such 
a standard would pose practical problems for the courts that Con-
gress could not have intended: “1.9 million beneficiaries of ERISA 
plans have health care claims denied each year ... [there were] 
257,507 total civil filings in federal court in 2007 ... Congress does 
not ‘hide elephants in mouseholes.’”84 Chief Justice Roberts agreed: 
“the majority is surely correct in concluding that it is important 
to retain deferential review for decisions made by conflicted ad-
ministrators, in order to avoid ‘near universal review by judges 
de novo.’”85 
The 2009 Citizens United decision,86 striking down re-
strictions on independent corporate campaign expenditures, in-
volved a host of issues. But the question of fiduciary loyalty was 
                                                                                                                         
76 Id. at 233. 
77 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008). 
78 Id. at 112. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 111–12. 
81 Id. at 115–17. 
82 Id. at 127. 
83 Id. at 121. 
84 Id. at 116. 
85 Id. at 121 (Roberts, J., concurring). 
86 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2009). 
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one of them.87 As we have seen, the main rationale for regulating 
corporate campaign contributions is that the contributions are 
similar to bribes in that they may induce the recipients to favor 
the interests of the payors over the interests of the constituents, 
which would violate the officials’ fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty 
to the constituents.88 
The Supreme Court rejected this loyalty argument.89 The 
Court held that to avoid encroaching on the First Amendment, 
the government could only prohibit quid pro quo corruption, money 
for official action, or its appearance.90 Even if campaign contribu-
tors get greater access to elected officials, the Court held, the mere 
selling of access to elected officials was not a form of disloyalty, 
or corruption, that the government could prohibit.91 The dissent 
by Justice Stevens, by contrast, took the view that “the difference 
between selling a vote and selling access is a matter of degree, 
not kind.”92 Justice Stevens, the only World War II veteran still on 
the Court, also argued that a corporation might be analogized to 
a foreign power, because its legal duties do not include patriotism, 
so the majority’s logic giving them a constitutional right to partici-
pate in our political process “would have accorded the propaganda 
broadcasts to our troops by ‘Tokyo Rose’ during World War II the 
same protection as speech by Allied commanders.”93 
The same theme of non-interference with conflicted fidu-
ciaries may be seen in Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P.,94 a 2010 
case involving mutual funds. A mutual fund is a pool of assets 
owned by the investors in the fund.95 Typically, a mutual fund is 
set up by a separate entity, an investment adviser, which selects 
the directors of the fund and then negotiates its compensation 
arrangement with the (supposedly) independent directors whom 
it has just selected.96 The question before the Supreme Court 
was how courts should review these compensation decisions under 
                                                                                                                         
87 Id. at 382, 386. 
88 Id. at 453. 
89 Id. at 379, 383. 
90 Id. at 384. 
91 Id. at 360. 
92 Id. at 447 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
94 Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 335 (2010). 
95 Id. at 338. 
96 Id. 
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a New Deal era statute, the Investment Company Act, which 
required the application of fiduciary standards.97 
The Court’s opinion made it clear that judicial review of 
these compensation decisions should be very deferential (essen-
tially ignoring the old rule that put the burden of proof on the 
conflicted fiduciary to prove substantive fairness).98 The Court 
said that if the mutual fund directors followed normal procedures, 
a judicial determination of impropriety “must be based on evi-
dence that the fee ‘is so disproportionately large that it bears no 
reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not 
have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.’”99 In a con-
curring opinion, Justice Thomas noted that the Court properly 
held investor plaintiffs challenging compensation decisions to a 
“heavy burden of proof ....”100 
That same year, 2010, the Supreme Court dealt with an-
other kind of fiduciary conflict in Skilling v. United States.101 Jeffrey 
Skilling, the former CEO of Enron, was convicted of engaging in 
a fraudulent scheme that deprived his company and its share-
holders of their right to his honest services in violation of a fed-
eral statute specifically intended to protect a principal’s right to 
honest services from a fiduciary.102 The Supreme Court held 
unanimously that the honest services fraud conviction had to be 
reversed because of vagueness concerns.103 
The majority opinion by Justice Ginsburg said that the 
honest services law had to be limited to bribes and kickbacks, 
which was not the specific accusation against Skilling.104 “Read-
ing the statute to proscribe a wider range of offensive conduct, 
we acknowledge, would raise the due process concerns underly-
ing the vagueness doctrine.”105 The Court rejected the Govern-
ment’s argument that the honest services law could be applied 
to undisclosed self-dealing (a practice the Court had condemned 
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as obviously immoral and illegal back in 1846),106 such as the pur-
suit of a fiduciary’s own financial interests while purporting to 
act in the interests of those to whom a duty is owed.107 The Court 
explained that the government’s theory 
leaves many questions unanswered. How direct or significant 
does the conflicting financial interest have to be? To what ex-
tent does the official action have to further that interest in order 
to amount to fraud? To whom should the disclosure be made, 
and what information should it convey?108 
A concurring opinion by Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
Kennedy and Justice Thomas, would have gone further and simply 
struck down the honest services law as void for vagueness rather 
than save it, for bribery cases, with a limiting construction.109 
Justice Scalia explained that the statute was intended to incor-
porate lofty, grandiloquent, “astoundingly broad” moralistic lan-
guage from prior lower court case law and the fiduciary duty 
standard articulated in those decisions was “hopelessly undefined” 
and therefore void for vagueness.110 
The Court came to a similar conclusion in McCutcheon v. 
Federal Election Commission,111 a 2013 case striking down a 
restriction on campaign contributions. As in Skilling, the Court 
drew a sharp distinction between quid pro quo bribery and kick-
backs, which the law could prohibit, and other forms of disloyalty, 
which the Court held to be constitutionally protected.112 The plu-
rality opinion by Chief Justice Roberts set the stage for its anal-
ysis by noting how the expansion of First Amendment freedoms 
undercut the broader loyalty justifications for restricting campaign 
contributions.113 “If the First Amendment protects flag burning, 
funeral protests, and Nazi parades—despite the profound offense 
such spectacles cause—it surely protects political campaign speech 
despite popular opposition.”114 
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The issue of loyalty and conflict of interest came before the 
Supreme Court in another 2013 case, Burt v. Titlow.115 Titlow was 
charged with helping her aunt kill the aunt’s husband.116 Titlow’s 
lawyer negotiated a plea bargain to manslaughter that would have 
gotten her a 7- to 15-year sentence.117 But a jailer heard Titlow 
protest her innocence after she entered her guilty plea and ad-
vised her to get a new lawyer.118 The new counsel, Fredrick Toca, 
agreed to represent Titlow and to take, as part of his payment, 
the publication rights to the story of the case.119 He then advised 
her to withdraw her guilty plea without reviewing the evidence 
against her or even talking to her prior counsel about why he had 
advised the plea bargain.120 The plea was withdrawn.121 Titlow 
went to trial on the murder charge, was convicted and received a 
sentence of 20 to 40 years.122 Titlow sought a writ of habeas cor-
pus based on ineffective assistance of counsel by Toca.123 The 
state courts rejected her argument, but the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sided with Titlow.124 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed unanimously, reinstat-
ing the conviction and holding that the federal court should have 
deferred to the state court factual findings on the duty of care 
issue.125 The fee arrangement between Titlow and Toca created 
an obvious conflict of interest.126 Because his payment included 
the publication rights to the story of the case, the lawyer Toca 
had a financial interest in an exciting trial that conflicted with 
his client’s interest in a quiet but favorable plea bargain.127 And 
under Supreme Court precedent the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel includes the right to conflict-free counsel.128 But the 
                                                                                                                         
115 Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 12 (2013). 
116 Id. at 13. 
117 Id. at 11–13. 
118 Id. at 16. 
119 Id. at 18. 
120 Id. at 14. 
121 Id. at 19. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 10. 
127 Id. at 14. 
128 Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 262, 272 (1981). 
2019] LOYALTY LOSES GROUND 631 
Court managed to avoid the conflict of interest problem by focus-
ing on the duty of care, not using the words “conflict of interest” 
to describe the issue and treating the state court decision as a 
finding of fact to which deference was due.129 
The fee arrangement, however, did not go unnoticed. The 
Court said the defense counsel might have violated professional 
rules by accepting publication rights.130 Nevertheless, the Court 
said, that did not amount to a constitutional violation.131 While 
the defense lawyer’s conduct was “far from exemplary ... the Sixth 
Amendment does not guarantee the right to perfect counsel; it 
promises only the right to effective assistance, and we have held 
that a lawyer’s violation of ethical norms does not make the lawyer 
per se ineffective.”132 
C. Something Significant Has Changed 
When considered in isolation, each of these recent deci-
sions might be explainable based on factors peculiar to the par-
ticular statute or constitutional provision at issue in that case. 
But when the decisions and their rhetoric are taken as a whole 
they reveal a profound change in the Supreme Court’s attitude 
toward fiduciary conflicts. Consider the before and after. 
In 1981, in Wood v. Georgia,133 the Supreme Court went out 
of its way to recognize a potential conflict of interest between crimi-
nal defendants and their counsel and to remand the case for a 
hearing, even though the defendants had not complained about 
the lawyer’s conduct.134 In 2013, in Burt v. Titlow, the Court went 
out of its way to ignore a serious and actual conflict of interest 
between a criminal defendant and her lawyer and to reinstate a 
conviction, even though the defendant was complaining bitterly 
about the lawyer’s conduct.135 
In 1981, in NLRB v. Amax Coal Company, the Court said 
that traditional fiduciary principles had to be read into ERISA 
                                                                                                                         
129 Id. at 263–66. 
130 Burt, 571 U.S. at 18. 
131 Id. at 17. 
132 Id. at 18. 
133 Wood, 450 U.S. at 261. 
134 Id. 
135 See generally id. 
632 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:615 
 
unless Congress clearly said otherwise.136 In 2000, in Pegram v. 
Herdrich, the Supreme Court said that traditional fiduciary princi-
ples should not be read into ERISA, absent a specific Congres-
sional command to do so, because the traditional principles were 
so impractical.137 
In 1939, in Pepper v. Litton, the Supreme Court said that 
conflict of interest transactions involving fiduciaries are presump-
tively unlawful and require a heavy burden of justification as to 
their substantive fairness, even if there has been perfect compli-
ance by the fiduciary with the technical requirements of the law.138 
In 2008 in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn, and 
in 2010, in Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P., the Supreme Court 
said that conflict of interest transactions involving fiduciaries 
are presumptively lawful and judicial review should normally be 
very deferential.139 
In 1846, in Michoud v. Girod, the Supreme Court said that 
undisclosed self-dealing by a fiduciary was obviously illegal and 
immoral and violative of every known code of jurisprudence.140 
In 2013, in Skilling v. United States, the Supreme Court said 
that a federal statute specifically intended to require honesty by 
fiduciaries could not be applied to undisclosed self-dealing by fidu-
ciaries because doing so would raise due process, void for vague-
ness concerns.141 
In 2003, in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the 
Supreme Court upheld restrictions on corporate campaign con-
tributions and expenditures based on the government’s legitimate 
interest in preventing corruption, including the sale of access to 
elected officials.142 In 2009, in Citizens United, the Supreme Court 
held that the First Amendment protected corporate campaign 
expenditures, even if the expenditures allowed corporations to 
buy access to elected officials.143 
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It is also remarkable that (except for the politically charged 
campaign finance cases where other considerations were in play) 
the new decisions have either been unanimous or the Court has 
adopted the position of its liberals, with the conservatives on the 
Court wanting to go even further in reducing fiduciary oversight. 
When it comes to the fiduciary loyalty, the Court seems to have 
changed its mind as a group. 
II. DIFFERENT WAYS OF VIEWING LOYALTY 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not overturned its nineteenth-
century conflict of interest decisions, which established basic rules 
of common law and equity. Those rules are still generally followed 
by State courts and by federal courts following State law, except 
when the old rules have been specifically modified by statute. For 
example, a 2018 decision of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit noted that: “Under Texas law, where a fidu-
ciary engages in a transaction with a party to whom the fiduciary 
owes duties, a presumption of unfairness arises, and the burden is 
placed on the fiduciary to establish that the transaction was fair.”144 
But the Supreme Court is backing away from its twentieth-
century practice of reading the traditional conflict rules into the 
silences and ambiguities of federal statutory and constitutional 
law.145 This shift is consistent with a larger story. The old fidu-
ciary rules were fashioned in a very different society. Ideas have 
changed. Contract norms have gained ground, while loyalty (even 
fiduciary loyalty) has become controversial.146 
A. The Old Ideas 
The modern idea of fiduciary loyalty was formed through 
the merger of two traditions. One was the fiduciary responsibil-
ity of trustees as articulated and enforced by courts of equity.147 
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The other, evoked by the word “loyalty,” was the type of fidelity 
that masters have traditionally demanded of their servants, 
kings of their subjects, armies of their soldiers, and religions of 
their faithful.148 
Both traditions treated duty in moralistic terms and not 
simply as a matter of contract. The English equity chancellors and 
ecclesiastical judges who created the rules for fiduciaries described 
the obligations of trustees with words like fidelity, integrity, faith 
and honor.149 “The chancellor was the keeper of the king’s con-
science” and a goal of equity was to prevent those acting in a fiduci-
ary capacity from gaining unfair advantages through opportunistic 
conduct.150 
The loyalty obligations of servants and subjects were likewise 
considered an important restraint on opportunism, as well as es-
sential for social cohesion, trust, order, and stability.151 The al-
ternatives were seen as frightening. Consider the Shakespeare 
plays Othello152 and Macbeth153 and how disloyalty by Iago to 
Othello and by Macbeth to King Duncan leads to tragedy. Or con-
sider the emotions aroused by words like “corruption,” “treason” 
or “betrayal” or by the mention of Judas Iscariot taking thirty 
pieces of silver.154 There was a visceral fear that without loyalty, 
society would dissolve into a war of all against all, or fall prey to 
its more unified enemies. 
Loyalty was designed to force moral behavior, not to facil-
itate deals. The analogy would be to our contemporary view of 
criminal law and its moral channeling role, as described in a 1997 
article by Judge Gerard Lynch: “What society wants from its 
members ... is not an intelligent calculation of the costs and ben-
efits of abiding by its basic norms, but more or less unthinking 
obedience to them.”155 
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The idea of loyalty also carried with it the notion that the 
agent or servant was part of a team; an agent is an instrument 
of the principal, rather than an autonomous individual.156 Because 
the agent was acting as the principal’s other self, the agent owed 
the principal a duty of self-abnegating, selfless devotion.157 
Actual behavior, of course, often fell short of this ideal. But 
the judicial response was to condemn the disloyalty, rather than 
the stringency.158 In 1910, for example, the Supreme Court de-
scribed the practice of government procurement officials taking 
kickbacks from contractors as “utterly vicious, unspeakably per-
nicious, and an unmixed evil.’”159 
The two traditions (fiduciary and loyalty) were brought 
together in the twentieth century. The first time that the New 
York Court of Appeals used the word “loyalty” to describe the 
duties of a fiduciary was in a 1926 opinion by Justice Cardozo.160 
The U.S. Supreme Court followed suit in 1941 in an opinion by 
Justice William Douglas.161 
The merger provided rhetorical support for the idea that 
corporate fiduciaries should be subject to the same type of loyal-
ty obligations traditionally demanded of servants. For example, 
in his 1914 book, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use 
It, Louis Brandeis used language associated with the loyalty du-
ties of servants (specifically the precept in Matthew 6:24 that “No 
man can serve two masters”) to describe the obligations of corpo-
rate directors, stating: “The practice of interlocking directorates 
is the root of many evils. It offends laws human and divine. ... [I]t 
tends to disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law that 
no man can serve two masters.”162 A 1934 article in the Harvard 
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Law Review by Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone made 
a similar reference, stating that most of the “mistakes” and “ma-
jor faults” of finance in the 1920s could be “ascribed to the failure 
to observe the fiduciary principle, the precept as old as holy writ, 
that ‘a man cannot serve two masters.’”163 
Another example of the moralistic tone of fiduciary law may 
be found in Professor Austin Scott’s classic 1949 California Law 
Review article, The Fiduciary Principle.164 Professor Scott began 
with a parable from the Gospel of Luke and toward the end quoted 
an article referring to the Gospel of Matthew.165 In between, Pro-
fessor Scott defined the duty of loyalty in moralistic terms: “In 
loyalty, when loyalty is properly defined, is the [fulfillment] of the 
whole moral law.”166 
Professor Scott also made it clear that because of its moral 
underpinnings a fiduciary relationship was quite different from 
a merely contractual one.167 For example: “Where the fiduciary 
does an act which would be a breach ... if he did not have the 
consent of his principal, such consent will protect him only if he 
has in no way taken advantage of his position as fiduciary in 
procuring the consent.”168 Professor Scott explained there were 
also substantive limitations on the fiduciary; “where the trustee 
has an adverse interest in the transaction, the consent of the 
beneficiary will not preclude him from holding the trustee liable 
for a breach of trust if the transaction was not fair and reasona-
ble.”169 Because of the fiduciary nature of the relationship, the 
“consent of the beneficiary is indeed a slender reed upon which a 
trustee may lean.”170 
In the middle years of the twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court treated the idea of fiduciary loyalty as an important pub-
lic policy that guided the construction of federal statutes and 
justified strict regulation of financial fiduciaries.171 That attitude 
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is best illustrated by a 1961 Supreme Court case, United States 
v. Mississippi Valley Generating Company.172 
The U.S. government wanted to negotiate a contract with 
a private company, the Mississippi Valley Generating Company, 
for the construction of a power plant.173 The government hired a 
vice president with the First Boston investment banking firm to 
provide the government with advice in connection with the nego-
tiations.174 At the time the adviser was hired, the government 
knew that First Boston might help arrange financing for the con-
struction project if the deal was signed.175 The advice was proper, 
the negotiations were successful, and the resulting deal was fair.176 
But the government lost interest in the project and wanted to get 
out of the contract.177 So the government sued its counterparty, 
Mississippi Valley, to void the contract on the ground that the First 
Boston vice president who had advised the government had a con-
flict of interest under a criminal statute, the federal conflict of 
interest law, because of the prospect that First Boston might help 
arrange financing.178 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government, 
with the Court’s liberals prevailing over its conservatives.179 The 
opinion for the Court by Chief Justice Warren explained: “The 
moral principle upon which the statute is based has its founda-
tion in the Biblical admonition that no man may serve two mas-
ters, Matt. 6:24, a maxim which is especially pertinent if one of 
the masters happens to be economic self-interest.”180 
It did not matter that the adviser had acted in good faith 
and that the contract was fair because the statute was “directed 
not only at dishonor, but also at conduct that tempts dishonor.”181 
Nor did it matter that the government had known First Boston 
might provide financing for the deal and insisted that the adviser 
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serve anyway; “we have consistently held that no government agent 
can properly claim exemption from a conflict-of-interest statute 
simply because his superiors did not discern the conflict.”182 
Strict enforcement was necessary, the Supreme Court ex-
plained, because “a democracy is effective only if the people have 
faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shat-
tered when high officials and their appointees engage in activi-
ties which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.”183 
Finally, the Supreme Court brushed aside the problem that 
the relevant law was a criminal statute that provided no civil 
remedy, let alone a civil remedy against an innocent third party 
that had not created, exploited or profited from the alleged conflict 
of interest of the government adviser.184 The Court explained 
that a remedy had to be implied because “the primary purpose of 
the statute is to protect the public from the corrupting influences 
that might be brought to bear upon government agents who are 
financially interested in the business transactions which they 
are conducting on behalf of the Government.”185 
The Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in 1963 in 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau,186 once again using the concept of loyalty as a justifica-
tion for strict regulation of financial fiduciaries.187 The case in-
volved an investment adviser’s practice of buying shares of a 
security for his own account, recommending that security to his 
clients for long-term investment and then selling the shares at a 
profit when its price rose following the recommendation.188 The 
Court held that the practice, without full disclosure to clients, 
constituted a fraud or deceit within the meaning of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940.189 The Court reasoned that the Investment 
Advisers Act was designed to “achieve a high standard of busi-
ness ethics in the securities industry”190 and “to eliminate, or at 
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least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an 
investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to render ad-
vice which was not disinterested.”191 
The Court regarded the investment adviser’s practice as a 
conflict of interest transaction similar to self-dealing and ex-
plained the rule against conflicts of interest was not justified not 
only by sound public policy but also by “the authoritative decla-
ration that no man can serve two masters; and considering that 
human nature must be dealt with, the rule does not stop with 
actual violations of such trust relations, but includes within its 
purpose the removal of any temptation to violate them ....”192 The 
Court went on: “The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was ‘di-
rected not only at dishonor, but also at conduct that tempts dis-
honor.’”193 The Court explained: “Experience has shown that 
disclosure in such situations, while not onerous to the adviser, is 
needed to preserve the climate of fair dealing which is so essen-
tial to maintain public confidence in the securities industry and 
to preserve the economic health of the country.”194 
B. From Conformity to Choice 
The Supreme Court’s rhetoric about fiduciary loyalty in 
Mississippi Valley and Capital Gains Research Bureau—the nega-
tive attitude toward self-interest and human nature; the talk about 
moral duty, evil, dishonor and the need to avoid temptation; the 
references to the Gospel of Matthew as authoritative; the broad 
construction of regulatory statutes; and the idea that high ethi-
cal standards are needed to preserve public trust in the govern-
ment and in the securities industry—stands in sharp contrast to 
the much more pragmatic approach toward loyalty of today’s 
Supreme Court.195 
The differences are consistent with more general changes. 
The United States in 1961 and 1963, back when the Supreme Court 
decided Mississippi Valley and Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
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was a very different country than it is now. There was less free-
dom, diversity, and wealth than there is now. On the other hand, 
there was more economic equality, faster growth, less debt and a 
much smaller fraction of the population in prison. 
Workers, minorities, and intellectuals were then allies in 
the political party that controlled the federal government. And 
under the leadership of that party, there was a spirit of optimism, 
idealism, and national unity that is hard to imagine today. In re-
sponse to a poll question in 1964, 76 percent of respondents said 
that the federal government could be trusted most of the time to 
do what was right.196 Armed with that confidence, the federal gov-
ernment was dismantling Jim Crow, enacting major civil rights 
legislation and getting the country more and more deeply involved 
in a land war in Asia.197 
Society back then was more tightly knit. The marriage rate 
was higher.198 People were more apt to participate in groups, such 
as labor unions, churches, political parties, and social clubs.199 
Society was also much more regimented. It was a time of loyalty 
oaths, restrictive divorce laws, patriarchy, hierarchy, conscription 
into the military, and a general ethic of deference to authority.200 
People not only belonged to groups. They generally followed the 
dictates of group leaders. Loyalty was the norm and something 
of an obligation. 
In a 1963 article on the First Amendment in the Yale Law 
Journal, Thomas Emerson described America of that time as an 
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increasingly organized, “highly conformist society” in which dis-
senters faced “overwhelming hazards.”201 According to Professor 
Emerson, “prosecutors, police and other officials charged with 
maintaining internal order are left largely unrestrained” and the 
“natural balance of forces in society today tends to be weighted 
against individual expression.”202 
And then America changed. Among other things, the norms 
supporting the old loyalty culture (such as group conformity and 
deference to authority) gave way to a new ethos celebrating in-
dividual autonomy, personal freedom, and self-realization.203 For 
example, protests about the civil rights movement and opposi-
tion to the Vietnam War led to legal disputes between protestors 
and local authorities.204 In a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme 
Court sided with the protestors.205 Eventually, in a 1969 deci-
sion involving student protestors, the Supreme Court held that 
peaceful protests were protected by the First Amendment and 
explained: “[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehen-
sion of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to free-
dom of expression.”206 
The ruling prompted an angry dissent by Justice Hugo 
Black,207 who had been one of the leading liberals on the Court 
from New Deal days until about 1965. Justice Black stated, “[i]t is 
a myth to say that any person has a constitutional right to say what 
he pleases, where he pleases, and when he pleases.”208 Justice 
Black thought that the rights of the community should be para-
mount: “[T]axpayers send children to school on the premise that 
at their age they need to learn, not teach.”209 He warned: “Change 
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has been said to be truly the law of life but sometimes the old 
and the tried and true are worth holding.”210 
Justice Black’s dissent is not well remembered. By contrast, 
the Court’s free speech decisions from that era have become the 
bedrock of our constitutional faith. For many, the First Amendment 
right to protest is now the cherished symbol of our nation.211 In-
deed, the protestors of that day soon came to be seen as heroic and 
more faithful to a higher morality than those who stood by the 
government.212 For that reason (and for many other reasons, includ-
ing the general disillusionment brought on by the Vietnam War 
and the Watergate scandal), attitudes toward authority changed. A 
new ethic of questioning, challenging, and debunking authority 
replaced the old notion of deference.213 Blind obedience and blind 
loyalty came to be considered as something bad.214 
An insightful article by Steven Smith reasoned through 
the new philosophy and found that people (including Americans) 
do not have an obligation to regard the laws of their own country 
as authoritative.215 Of course, one might choose to comply with a 
law for prudential reasons or because the particular law happened 
to coincide with one’s own moral code. But there was nothing about 
the law having been enacted by one’s own government that cre-
ates even a presumptive duty of obedience. Professor Smith con-
cluded that under “modern assumptions, centrally including a 
commitment to individual autonomy ... ‘legitimate’ or normatively 
attractive authority ... seems impossible, almost inconceivable.”216 
A key part of a culture is the attitude of individuals toward 
society’s leaders. Willing deference to authority was a cornerstone of 
the old loyalty ideal, as well as a hallmark of the New Deal, World 
War II generation.217 Americans accepted a regulated, regimented 
society, in which loyalty was expected and required, in large part 
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because of this ethic.218 The new thinking about the proper re-
spect for authority changed a great deal. 
For one thing, the new attitude fostered skepticism about 
federal government efforts to legislate morality, mandate social 
reforms,219 or regulate business. Influential thinkers concluded that 
the deficiencies of legislators were far worse than those of corporate 
agents,220 and that it would be a mistake to assume that gov-
ernment regulation would be preferable to the free market.221 
Distrust of the federal government became the norm. In 
1964, 76 percent of survey respondents said Americans could trust 
the government in Washington to do what is right most of the time; 
however, in 1996, only 19 percent of the respondents to the same 
question said the government could be trusted.222 
There was also new thinking as to the primacy of individ-
ual self-realization and self-fulfillment—first in law review arti-
cles,223 then in Supreme Court opinions,224 and then as a matter 
of course. A 1992 article by Jana Singer, for example, noted that 
the words “‘[c]hoice’ and ‘autonomy’ are becoming synonyms for 
‘right’ and ‘good.’”225 In 2002, Evelyn Brody could simply take as 
a given that “our broader political structure ... enshrines indi-
vidual autonomy as its core norm.”226 A 2015 book by Edward 
Rubin described self-fulfillment as a moral obligation.227 
To be sure, the individualist philosophy was sharply con-
tested both in the general culture and in the legal culture. Many 
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people believed in a more community-oriented view in which the 
individual was treated as a member of a group and the interests 
of the group and its moral code took precedence.228 But there 
was no longer a single dominant moral code for the country to 
rally behind.229 An incomplete cultural revolution had left the 
nation divided. 
On the issue of religion, for example, many believed that 
morality should be consistent with the Bible, while many others 
regarded the Bible as divisive and unnecessary.230 Conservatives 
wanted to restore the values of America’s past. Progressives saw 
that past as shameful.231 In their view as expressed in a 2000 
article, “we cannot and should not go home again to those homo-
geneous and exclusionary ... ‘communities of place’—which de-
valued difference and included elements of subordination.”232 
For their part, conservatives had a similarly dim view of the 
progressive social agenda, believing that progressives were seek-
ing to destroy conservative communities, religion, values, and cul-
ture.233 Progressive efforts to suppress “hate speech” and corporate 
campaign contributions were seen by conservatives as attempts to 
suppress conservative speech.234 Conservatives also felt threat-
ened by the progressive idea that the government had “an af-
firmative duty to dismantle unequal conditions between racial 
groups created by historical systems of domination or inequities.”235 
As a result of these disagreements, many who were sym-
pathetic to communitarian ideals came to see the individualist 
position as the only workable compromise.236 The communitari-
an goal of a shared community based on shared values seemed 
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impractical, at least at the national level.237 As one article put it, 
“Can there be social solidarity ... in a heterogeneous, diverse 
society?”238 
C. Morals of the Marketplace 
Meanwhile, there were big changes in how law and society 
viewed the market. Years earlier, Justice Cardozo had described 
fiduciary loyalty, “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,” 
as something higher than the mere “morals of the market place,” 
the standard of behavior “for those acting at arm’s length” that was 
“trodden by the crowd.”239 But in the new thinking, that hierarchy 
flipped. For many, the morals of the marketplace seemed the 
better model. 
Loyalty, after all, requires subordination and self-
abnegation.240 That is hard to square with what one article de-
scribed as “our broader political structure that enshrines individual 
autonomy as its core norm.”241 Furthermore, as Professor Donald 
Langevoort noted, “a legal ethic of service to others” faces diffi-
culties “in a culture that celebrates personal wealth, achieve-
ment and consumption.”242 
And there was more. By its very nature, loyalty requires 
partiality toward those to whom one is loyal.243 We are not loyal 
to the world. We are loyal to particular people, groups or enti-
ties. The whole idea of allegiance means taking a side. As Co-
lumbia Law Professor George Fletcher explained in a 1993 book 
on loyalty, “[o]utsiders cannot claim equal treatment with those who 
are the objects of loyal attachment.”244 Furthermore, he stated 
that these “[l]oyalties circumscribe communitarian circles.”245 
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These aspects of loyalty became suspect after the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 outlawed various forms of discrimination.246 
Traditional loyalty, with its attendant ideas of communitarian 
trust and in-group bonding, came to be seen by many as a form 
of bias, a source of division, and potential tool of oppression.247 
Professor Frank Cross expressed this view well in a 2005 article 
when he said that trust based on shared values is often a “form 
of cronyism” or “a cover for racism, sexism, and nationalism.”248 
According to Professor Cross, the “idealized past” was an age of 
prejudice,249 the in-group bonding produced by its loyalties was 
“divisive by its nature,”250 and the social trust created by loyalty 
was often an enabler of corrupt and authoritarian governments.251 
Proponents of loyalty, particularly in the legal academy, 
found it hard to respond. In his book, Professor Fletcher tried to 
justify loyalty on emotional grounds as an alternative that “beckons 
to those of us who suffer from the rootlessness and anomie of a 
society in which families disintegrate, friendships are hard to 
maintain, and working relationships are ‘cashed out’ in the capi-
talist marketplace.”252 But Professor Fletcher had to acknowledge 
that loyalty conflicted with the now dominant idea of universal, 
impartial moral values and that it was difficult to make a ra-
tional, philosophical case for loyalty.253 
Loyalty went from being a generally accepted norm to some-
thing controversial. And while many institutions stood by the old 
loyalty idea (such as the Marine Corps, whose motto remained 
semper fidelis), many other institutions backed away. For example, 
“[i]n 1972, the Girl Scouts deleted from their handbook the re-
quirement that a scout be ‘loyal.’”254 
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Just as loyalty was falling in status, the free market was 
gaining.255 Memories of the Depression were fading. Wall Street 
seemed a place of vitality and success.256 And the morals of the 
marketplace were more in keeping with the new ideals. After all, 
the market does not require subordination, self-abnegation, or 
discrimination. On the contrary, the market is designed to promote 
freedom, individual autonomy, self-realization, informed choice, 
and impartial detachment. The free market is also better adapted to 
dealing with diversity, complexity, change, and choice. 
Professor Fletcher captured the new thinking in his 1993 
book when he said: “The exemplar of the marketplace has con-
quered neighboring arenas. Today we think about relatives, em-
ployers, religious groups, and nations the way we think about 
companies that supply us with other products and services.”257 
The market became the measure of all things.258 
To be sure, the idea of loyalty did not vanish. But fewer 
people saw loyalty as a moral obligation imposed by society that 
the law could enforce. Instead, loyalty was seen more as a poten-
tial contract term or as a way of choosing one’s identity through 
an act of self-expression.259 
One example of the changed thinking involves the expected 
relationship between the citizen and the nation. In the past, 
loyalty to your country had been a required norm. Think conscrip-
tion into the military and the Pledge of Allegiance. But that 
changed. Loyalty to country became, at best, an option, like brand 
loyalty, and not something that the law could require or protect.260 
Consider the metaphors that Justice Stevens and Chief Jus-
tice Roberts used in the campaign finance cases. Justice Stevens, a 
World War II veteran, compared corporate campaign expenditures 
to the propaganda broadcasts of Tokyo Rose, an example from 
his generation of disloyal speech intended to produce disloyalty 
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that was punishable as treason.261 Chief Justice Roberts, by con-
trast, compared campaign contributions to protestors burning an 
American Flag, an example from his generation of disloyal con-
duct intended to produce disloyalty that is protected by the First 
Amendment.262 
The same rethinking may be seen in debate over the Oath 
of Allegiance required for naturalized citizens. The Oath man-
dates renunciation of all former allegiances, based on the theory 
(as stated in an 1859 opinion of the United States Attorney Gen-
eral) that “no government would allow one of its subjects to divide 
his allegiance between it and another sovereign, for they all know 
that no man can serve two masters.”263 Today’s legal culture rejects 
the idea of the nation as a master and regards the citizen more like 
a customer.264 For example, a 1997 article by Peter Spiro argued: 
“In a world of liberal states ... the necessity of exclusive allegiances 
has largely dissipated” so that “acceptance of dual nationality” is 
demanded by “liberal conceptions of citizenship.”265 
There was a similar change in the rules governing marriage. 
Traditionally, law treated marriage as a status from which it was 
difficult to opt out.266 That paradigm was challenged in the 1960s.267 
Growing support for “consumer sovereignty and the pursuit of 
self-interest in all spheres of life” led legal economists “to cele-
brate private markets as the ideal form of social interaction in 
both the family and nonfamily realms.”268 This new thinking led 
to the adoption of no-fault divorce laws, beginning with Califor-
nia in 1969 and covering forty-six other States by 1976.269 
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Because of these and other changes, marriage evolved in-
to a relationship “regulated by contractual norms”270 and family 
members were “increasingly treated as autonomous individuals.”271 
The law no longer concerned itself with ensuring loyalty or group 
cohesion. The new emphasis on “individual freedom” and “self-
realization” together with the option of unilateral exit at will 
reduced “the potency of societal norms promoting fidelity, loyalty, 
and cooperation in marriage.”272 
Around the same time, something roughly similar took 
place in the workplace. Corporations abandoned their Eisenhower 
era paternalism toward employees in favor of an ethic of maxim-
izing shareholder value, a shift chronicled in a recent book aptly 
titled The End of Loyalty.273 As June Carbone and Nancy Levit 
noted in a 2017 article entitled The Death of the Firm, the idea 
of a company as an organic unit was rejected274 and workers 
became “fungible commodities” rather than loyal and valued 
members of a team.275 
Corporate scholars echoed this thought, treating corpora-
tions as simply a nexus of contracts and rejecting the idea of any 
organic unity.276 In the new environment, as James Nelson noted 
in 2015, businesses were “no longer willing to make implicit prom-
ises of job security,” so employees could not “make deep and on-
going commitments to those organizations.”277 Identification with 
one’s employer (the psychological aspect of loyalty) became dys-
functional.278 
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D. The Challenge for Fiduciary Loyalty 
These developments shook the foundations of fiduciary 
loyalty. The word “loyalty” was no longer an asset for the concept. 
Choice was the new norm. The model of contract had become the 
dominant paradigm.279 Legal rules governing relationships of all 
types were increasingly seen “as resting mainly on imputed bar-
gains that are susceptible to alteration by actual bargains.”280 
And so, if marriage and citizenship were just contracts and cor-
porations nothing more than a nexus of contracts, it was hard to 
see why fiduciary relationships should be treated as anything 
other than contractual. 
Supporters of this contractarian approach argued that it 
was enough to require fiduciaries to keep their word.281 The compet-
itive market for fiduciary services would force them to make the 
necessary promises.282 Fencing in amorphous duties through con-
tract would also reduce socially wasteful litigation costs.283 In 
addition, treating fiduciary relationships as contractual, and allow-
ing parties to set their own terms, would be consistent with the 
general trend in favor of greater freedom. The old rules, the ar-
gument went, reflected outmoded pessimism or starry-eyed ide-
alism about how fiduciaries actually conducted themselves.284 
Replacing the moralistic loyalty rhetoric with ordinary contract 
norms would bring the law more in line with business reality.285 
But there were many who opposed this approach, believing 
that it would allow the powerful to escape their moral obligations 
through their control of contract forms.286 As the anti-contractarians 
saw it, the promotion of individual autonomy and choice was 
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intended to liberate the oppressed, so it would be perverse for these 
ideas to be used to enhance the power of the strong.287 The free-
dom agenda should not mean greater freedom for fiduciaries.288 
Elite opinion was divided on this subject. This disagree-
ment might have remained the subject of academic debate alone. 
But developments on Wall Street made it relevant for the country 
and created a powerful lobby for applying market logic to fiduci-
ary relationships.289 
On May 1, 1975, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) ended the New York Stock Exchange’s practice of fixed, non-
competitive brokerage commissions.290 Wall Street profits fell 
from “$915 million in 1971 to $188 million in 1977.”291 The industry 
had to think outside the fiduciary box in order to survive. No longer 
able to rely on large brokerage commissions as a stable source of 
revenue, Wall Street needed to find new ways to make money.292 
The quest was successful, and then some. The junk bond 
fueled takeover boom of the 1980s was just one of many exam-
ples of how the securities industry learned to become more crea-
tive.293 The innovations made the business much more profitable 
and, as a consequence, much more politically powerful. 
The political resurgence came at an opportune time. The 
New Deal coalition against economic royalists had broken up over 
cultural issues.294 Neither party had any particular antipathy 
toward Wall Street. Both were eager for its campaign contributions. 
Flush with cash, and willing to finance both sides, the financial 
services industry found political allies among Democrats and 
Republicans.295 The industry used its influence and well-crafted 
                                                                                                                         
287 Id. at 50. 
288 See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fi-
duciary Obligation, 37 DUKE L.J. 879 (1988). 
289 See id. at 902. 
290 See Jessica C. Wiley, Note, Will the “Bang” Mean “Big” Changes in Japanese 
Financial Laws, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 379, 388 (1999). 
291 Id. at 388. 
292 See id. at 388–89. 
293 See generally William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional 
Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken To Enron To Goldman Sachs, 86 
S. CAL. L. REV. 783 (2013). 
294 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Road to Repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 441, 504–05 (2017). 
295 See id. at 512. 
652 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:615 
 
arguments296 to eliminate barriers to market freedom.297 Stock 
prices increased,298 lending credence to the industry position and 
leading to still more deregulation.299 
Among the rules swept away were New Deal era restrictions 
designed to eliminate conflicts of interest in the financial services 
industry, such as the separation of the securities business, in-
surance and commercial banking.300 Firms were able to step outside 
their traditional roles and act instead as market participants and 
dealmakers.301 To add capital, many firms transformed themselves 
from cautious partnerships into profit-maximizing corporations.302 
The new business model led to a new ethic. Staid, safe and sound 
gave way to aggressive, nimble and opportunistic.303 Wall Street 
developed a culture based on constant change, liquidation of 
relationships, and a single-minded focus on short-term profits.304 
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Of course, Wall Street could not do all this on its own. The 
industry needed corporations as clients and counterparties. To gen-
erate this business, Wall Street encouraged corporate managers 
to stop thinking of themselves as stewards of a corporate com-
munity and, instead, to think more like owner-entrepreneurs.305 
Frequently, managers were incentivized to change their thinking 
with deals that gave them greater personal interests in the re-
structured company. So, Wall Street culture spread.306 “The sta-
ble bureaucratic structures of the corporation” were replaced “by 
a new institutional structure that value[d] disloyalty, irrespon-
sibility, and immediacy.”307 The market stopped expecting fidu-
ciary behavior from corporate managers, assuming instead that 
they would “hold their own personal interests paramount.”308 
Large law firms adopted the ethos of their most powerful 
clients. Their attitudes toward relationships became more transac-
tional and businesslike. The Chair of the ABA Law Practice Man-
agement Section announced that “[t]he ‘commoditization of law’” 
was something to be “welcomed and not feared,”309 a sign that 
leading lawyers were moving away from the professionalism ideal 
toward “treating the practice of law just like any other business.”310 
Meanwhile, the cultural change on Wall Street intensified. 
A 2013 book by Yale Law Professor Jonathan Macey, The Death 
of Corporate Reputation, subtitled How Integrity Has Been De-
stroyed on Wall Street,311 described how investment banks and 
other firms in the securities business found they did not need a 
reputation for selfless, fiduciary behavior in order to attract 
business. Customer trust expectations were lower, yet the indus-
try was more profitable than ever.312 
But there was friction. Legal rules did not keep pace with 
changing industry norms, which sometimes resulted in liability.313 
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For example, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, various 
financial institutions settled claims by government regulators 
regarding their practices contributing to the crisis.314 “By the 
end of 2016, the costs associated with those settlements for the 
sixteen largest banks collectively totaled more than $320 billion.”315 
A separate, postcrisis matter involving alleged manipulation of 
interest rate benchmarks resulted in settlements totaling about 
$9 billion,316 while another set of postcrisis charges, relating to 
foreign exchange transactions, resulted in regulatory fines of almost 
$15 billion.317 
There were other practices, before the crisis, that did not sit 
well with the old fiduciary rules. For example, firms paid brokers 
for steering client business318 and contributed money to govern-
ment officials to influence “the selection and retention of pension 
plan investment advisers.”319 Firms also engaged in practices 
adverse to the interests of their customers, such as front run-
ning customer orders, betting against customer trades, acting 
for multiple parties in the same set of transactions, and advising 
customers to become counterparties in complex deals.320 
The industry saw these activities as legitimately entrepre-
neurial. Many firms tried to mitigate their exposure to challenge 
under the old fiduciary rules through contracts, disclosures, and 
disclaimers.321 But the safeguards did not always work. Here are 
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some examples (the facts recited are generally allegations by the 
plaintiffs and not necessarily true). 
According to allegations in an Illinois case, Shahid Khan 
came to Deutsche Bank seeking help with a business deal that 
required the use of foreign currency.322 The bank advised Khan 
to enter into a series of complex foreign currency transactions with 
the bank, telling him the deals would either result in his making 
money on the deals or incurring tax-deductible losses.323 In fact, 
the deals were designed to result in profits for the bank and losses 
for Khan that would not be tax deductible.324 After suffering 
non-tax-deductible losses on the deals, Khan sued for breach of 
fiduciary duty.325 
Deutsche Bank argued that Khan had contracted away any 
right to fiduciary loyalty by signing a contract early in the rela-
tionship that said the bank was not acting as his fiduciary.326 
But the Illinois Appellate Court said the allegations supported an 
inference that the bank had a relationship of trust with Khan.327 
“After all, Deutsche Bank was a prestigious investment bank, 
highly sophisticated in its field and capable, by its very name, of 
inspiring confidence.”328 The Court went on: “All in all, one could 
get the impression that Khan was considerably out of his ele-
ment and that he more or less was told where to sign.”329 
The Appellate Court said the contractual disclaimer of fi-
duciary duty was void because the bank was already acting as 
Khan’s fiduciary when he signed the agreement and to obtain his 
informed consent the bank would have had to disclose all relevant 
material facts, including the falsity of its prior representations.330 
In another case, a technology company needed money.331 
The company sought help from a group of lenders and received a 
loan, investments, and directors who were affiliated with the 
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lenders.332 The directors from the lenders (the only ones on the 
company’s board with financial acumen) arranged a subsequent 
loan for the company from the lenders.333 The new loan provided 
that in the event the company was liquidated “the lenders would 
be entitled to be paid twice the outstanding principal of the loan 
plus any accrued but unpaid interest on it; as a result, little if 
anything would be left for the shareholders.”334 
After the company went bankrupt, it sued the directors and 
the lenders alleging that the deal was unfair.335 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit, applying Delaware law, held that 
the defendants had the burden of showing that the loan terms 
were at least as fair to the company as they would have been if 
the directors had been loyal to the company.336 The fact that the 
directors had disclosed their conflict of interest did not relieve 
them of the burden of showing fairness, the Court held, because the 
directors still had a duty to be loyal to the company.337 The Court 
explained: “A director may tell his fellow directors that he has a 
conflict of interest but that he will not allow it to influence his ac-
tions as director; he will not tell them he plans to screw them.”338 
Another illustrative case arose out of the initial public of-
fering of eToys for which Goldman Sachs acted as the managing 
lead underwriter. According to the company, Goldman also agreed 
to provide the company with financial advice as to how to price the 
offering.339 After receiving Goldman’s input, the company signed 
a contract whereby the company would sell its shares to Goldman 
and the other underwriters at $18.65 per share and they would 
offer the shares to the public at $20 per share, which would give 
the underwriters a potential profit of 6.75 percent.340 As it hap-
pened, the stock closed at $76.56 on its first day of trading.341 
The company later went bankrupt and sued Goldman, al-
leging that the investment bank had breached its fiduciary duty 
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to the company by not disclosing a conflict of interest.342 More 
specifically, the company alleged that Goldman had a secret incen-
tive to advise the company to price its initial public offering below 
a fair market price because Goldman had secret arrangements 
whereby the firms that purchased stock from Goldman at $20 
per share would later pay Goldman 20 percent to 40 percent of 
any profits that they made reselling the stock.343 
Goldman argued that its relationship with eToys was strictly 
contractual and that the contract did not create any fiduciary 
duties.344 But the New York Court of Appeals said that under 
New York law “fiduciary ‘liability is not dependent solely upon an 
agreement or contractual relation between the fiduciary and the 
beneficiary but results from the relation’” so that even if the under-
writing contract did not itself establish a fiduciary duty the 
company could allege that a relationship of trust apart from the 
contract had, in fact, been created.345 The court concluded that the 
allegations supported a claim that Goldman had a fiduciary ob-
ligation to disclose its conflict of interest with respect to “the 
pricing of the IPO.”346 
Another case from New York involved short sales by Morgan 
Stanley based on non-public information.347 Veleron Holding 
borrowed money from BNP Paribas and provided as collateral its 
stock in Magna International.348 Veleron was required to post addi-
tional collateral if the value of the Magna stock fell below a certain 
level.349 The loan agreement had a confidentiality provision.350 
BNP engaged Morgan Stanley to act as its Disposal Agent for the 
Magna stock in the event a loan default gave BNP the right to sell 
the collateral.351 Later, BNP told Morgan Stanley that the value 
of the collateral was going down and that Veleron was unlikely 
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to meet a margin call on the loan.352 Morgan Stanley then, acting in 
its own capacity, shorted Magna stock (essentially a bet that the 
price would go down, done by selling borrowed shares), which 
allegedly caused the market price to collapse.353 
When Veleron sued Morgan Stanley, the investment bank 
argued that it did not have a fiduciary duty of confidentiality be-
cause the contract it signed with BNP, even though it designated 
Morgan Stanley “BNP’s Disposal Agent” specifically provided that 
Morgan Stanley was “‘acting as an independent contractor and 
not as a fiduciary ... or in any other position of higher trust.’”354 
The district court rejected this argument, holding that, under 
New York law, agency relationships carry with them fiduciary 
duties as a matter of law.355 The court held that whether the 
parties had entered into such a relation was for a jury to decide 
based on their actual relationship.356 The language of the contract 
was relevant, but not dispositive, because one cannot “avoid a 
duty’s being deemed fiduciary in nature by the simple expedient 
of refusing to call it by its proper name.”357 
From Wall Street’s perspective, these decisions and others 
like them represented unwarranted judicial interference with 
freedom and the modern market. As the industry saw it, deals 
should be governed by the terms of the written agreement and 
normal rules of contract construction.358 Except when cabined by 
something in writing, economic actors should be free to pursue 
their self-interest.359 Courts should not be inserting amorphous 
moral duties into private deals.360 That sort of paternalism was 
outmoded and reduced overall wealth.361 In the industry’s view, 
the definition of fiduciary loyalty needed to be updated to make 
it compatible with the new business reality.362 
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The “contractarian” academic philosophy discussed earlier 
was perfectly suited to the task. Scholars following this approach 
argued that the same market logic that had discredited other 
forms of loyalty should be applied to fiduciary loyalty as well.363 
Fiduciary relationships, in their view, were simply contractual 
and should be governed entirely by contract norms.364 There was 
nothing special about the duty of loyalty. It was simply (at best) 
a set of possible implied contract terms and did not carry any 
moral freight.365 
So, the prejudice against conflicts of interest was a mis-
take, John Langbein argued: “Conflicts of interest are endemic in 
human affairs, and they are not inevitably harmful. Accordingly, 
indiscriminate efforts to prohibit conflicts can work more harm than 
good.”366 “The very term ‘conflict’ is an epithet that prejudices our 
understanding that some overlaps of interest are either harm-
less or positively value enhancing for all affected interests.”367 
Also outmoded, according to the contractarians, was the 
idea that fiduciaries were somehow different from other market 
participants.368 For example, a recent article by Dana Remus noted 
how “scholars, commentators, and bar leaders alike” have been 
pushing the legal profession to adopt the logic of the market.369 
Professor Remus observed that their arguments followed a larger 
trend.370 “Neoliberal thought, which seeks to extend market 
rationalities to all areas of social life, has become the ‘common-
sense way’ of our era.”371 
The most influential expression of the contractarian view 
came in a 1993 article by Judge Frank Easterbrook and Profes-
sor Daniel Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, which said that 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty was not a moral obligation but simply 
a set of terms that may or may not be implied into particular 
contracts.372 According to Easterbrook and Fischel: “The usual 
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economic assessments of contractual terms and remedies apply. 
Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing; 
they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the 
same way, as other contractual undertakings. Actual contracts 
always prevail over implied ones.”373 
The Easterbrook & Fischel article was well timed. During 
the Cold War, an argument for loyalty had been the need to main-
tain the social order and avoid class conflict. But with the fall of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, free market capitalism no longer had a 
rival. The cautionary argument for loyalty lost force. It seemed a 
safe time to replace patriarchal relations with the cash nexus.  
The case for loyalty was further undermined by the secu-
larization of the legal culture. In the middle years of the twentieth 
century, jurists cited the precept from Gospel of Matthew “No man 
can serve two masters” to justify the prohibition against fiduciary 
conflicts.374 But in the new age, the quasi-religious tone of the 
old cases became a talking point for the contractarians. In 1995, 
for example, John Langbein denounced the “pulpit-thumping rheto-
ric about the sanctity” of fiduciary duties.375 In 2017, Gabriel 
Rauterberg & Eric Talley disparaged the duty of loyalty as a 
“long-hallowed ‘sacred cow’ of fiduciary principles.”376 
To be sure, the contractarians did not dominate the acad-
emy. On the contrary, most fiduciary scholars found secular reasons 
for preserving or expanding the fiduciary principle, seeing it as 
an important restraint on the powerful and source of protection 
for the vulnerable.377 
                                                                                                                         
373 Id. at 427. 
374 Matthew 6:24 (King James). 
375 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 
YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995). 
376 Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty 
of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1075, 1119 (2017). For a more positive view of the relevance of religion, 
see Lyman Johnson, Reflecting on Three Decades of Corporate Law Scholarship, 
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677, 677–78 (2017); see also Lyman Johnson, Faith and 
Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006). See generally 
Frankel, supra note 146. 
377 See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 146, at 623; Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in 
Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 35 TEX. L. REV. 993, 993 
(2017); Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expec-
tations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 925 (2006); 
 
2019] LOYALTY LOSES GROUND 661 
State courts have generally followed tradition, rejecting 
attempts to turn fiduciary duties into contractual ones, except 
when the change is mandated by statute. Their prevailing view, 
expressed in a 2007 California Appellate opinion, is that: “an 
agent’s duty of loyalty arises not from any contract but from the 
parties’ relationship.”378 
Thus, the remedies for breach of fiduciary duty under State 
law go beyond those for breach of contract. Disloyal fiduciaries 
may be required to disgorge their ill-gotten gains or forfeit their 
fees, even if the plaintiff has not suffered any damage.379 One 
justification, as the Indiana Supreme Court explained in 2008, is 
that “by promoting the agent’s integrity, the disgorgement rule 
facilitates the principal’s trust on which the fiduciary relation-
ship is grounded.”380 
State courts have also rejected the contractarian idea that 
conflict of interest transactions should be reviewed under nor-
mal contract standards.381 Instead, they have followed the tradi-
tional, moralistic approach. The examples are legion. 
In 2017, the California Supreme Court held that a criminal 
conflict of interest statute “should be construed broadly, to ensure 
that the public has the official’s ‘absolute loyalty and undivided 
allegiance.’”382 In 2014, the Maryland Court of Appeals disbarred an 
attorney for borrowing money from a client trust to pay his per-
sonal debts, holding that “it is a breach of trust for a trustee to 
lend trust funds to himself ... [e]ven where the trustee is authorized 
to make such investments as in his absolute and uncontrolled 
discretion he may see fit”383 because “it is generally not possible 
for the same person to act fairly in two capacities and on behalf 
of two interests in the same transaction.”384 
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In 2014, a New York Appellate Court said that the fiduciary’s 
“duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty” requires the fiduciary to 
avoid “situations in which a fiduciary’s personal interest possi-
bly conflicts with the interest of those owed a fiduciary duty.”385 
To like effect from the Wyoming Supreme Court in 2015: “The 
duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing by trustees, because ‘[i]t is 
not possible for any person to act fairly in the same transaction 
on behalf of himself and in the interest of the trust beneficiary.’”386 
And from the South Dakota Supreme Court in 2016: “‘A fiduci-
ary must act with utmost good faith and avoid any act of self-
dealing that places [his] personal interest in conflict with [his] 
obligations to the beneficiaries.’”387 
At a minimum, State courts have required conflicted fidu-
ciaries to show that the transaction was fair. As a Texas Appellate 
Court explained in 2014: “The presumption of unfairness applies to 
transactions between a fiduciary and a principal in which the fidu-
ciary profits or obtains a benefit. ... In such cases, the profiting 
fiduciary bears the burden to rebut the presumption by proving 
the fairness of the questioned transaction.”388 
Or as the Alaska Supreme Court explained in 2015, most 
State courts model their standard of review for interested direc-
tor transactions “after Delaware’s, which requires ‘the [self-
interested] directors to prove that the bargain [was] at least as 
favorable to the corporation as they would have required if the 
deal had been made with strangers.’”389 The Court went on: “This 
exacting standard has come to be known as the ‘entire fairness’ 
test, and it ‘requires judicial scrutiny regarding both fair dealing 
and fair price.’”390 
In 2015, for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
voided an arbitration agreement between a doctor and a patient 
because the doctor did not make “full disclosure of the nature 
and import of the arbitration agreement” to the patient “at or 
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before the time it was presented for his signature.”391 The nor-
mal contract rules did not apply, the Court explained, because a 
fiduciary is held to a stricter standard.392 Similarly, the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court in 2017 voided an arbitration agreement 
in a client engagement letter because the lawyer had not explained 
the “scope and effect of that provision” in terms understandable 
to the client before obtaining the client’s signature.393 The Court 
explained that contract norms did not govern because “attorneys 
owe a fiduciary duty of ‘undivided loyalty’ to their clients, a duty 
that is derived from the common law” and persists independent 
of “codified ethical standards.”394 
The contractarians have had better success with State 
legislatures. While the basic rules remain in place, some State 
statutes have been amended to allow parties to contract out of 
traditional duties of loyalty in specific areas. The Revised Uni-
form Partnership Act, for example, reduces mandatory fiduciary 
standards.395 Similarly, the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act permits the drafter of a limited partnership 
agreement “to disclaim fiduciary duties, and replace them with 
contractual duties.”396 
There have been similar changes in corporation law and 
practice. For example, a 2017 article by Gabriel Rauterberg & 
Eric Talley, found that hundreds of companies have taken ad-
vantage of permissive changes in State corporation laws to adopt 
charter provisions opting out of the corporate opportunity doctrine, 
an aspect of the duty of loyalty that prohibits corporate fiduciar-
ies from competing with the company, evincing “a significant 
appetite for contracting out of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.”397 
Trust law and practice has also become more contractarian. 
A 2017 article by Adam Hofri-Winogradow, for example, found that 
due to changes in trust statutes and new ways of drafting trust 
instruments, trusts administered by corporate fiduciaries have 
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become more like ordinary contracts.398 The article noted: “The 
fiduciary situation has morphed from a relationship to a trans-
action, with fiduciaries only prepared to bear well-defined and 
clearly priced risks, rather than the open-ended protective com-
mitment characteristic of the classical fiduciary.”399 Professor Hofri 
concluded: “The transformation of fiduciary practice resembles that 
of other social institutions, such as marriage, which were classically 
characterized by a long-term open-ended commitment of each 
party to the other, as well as by exit difficulties. It expresses the 
social alienation and relationship commodification characteristic 
of current society.”400 
And, as we have seen, the contractarians have done well 
in the U.S. Supreme Court. Less bound by precedent than the 
State courts, more willing to make policy and more in tune with 
the attitudes of large law firms and financial elites, the United 
States Supreme Court has repeatedly departed from its past 
practice and construed federal fiduciary standards in a more 
contractarian way.401 While the Court has not completely dropped 
the old loyalty rules, the Court seems less and less inclined to 
read the old standards into the silences and ambiguities of fed-
eral law.402 
CONCLUSION 
State and federal fiduciary law used to be the same. Now 
there is a split. State courts still generally adhere to the tradi-
tional standard for regulating fiduciary conflicts (the same 
standard that the U.S. Supreme Court followed in the twentieth 
century), except when the old loyalty rules have been specifically 
modified by statute.403 The U.S. Supreme Court has been loosen-
ing fiduciary restrictions on its own.404 State courts treat loyalty 
as a moral obligation arising out of a fiduciary relationship.405 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has been dealing with the subject much 
more pragmatically and more in keeping with the preferences of 
financial elites.406 
For supporters of market freedom, the Supreme Court’s new 
approach is good news. And for those who prefer a broad con-
struction of fiduciary loyalty, there are more and more reasons 
to appreciate the role of State courts in enforcing basic princi-
ples of justice. 
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